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The extent to which the linguistic system—its architecture, the representations it operates
on, the constraints it is subject to—is specific to language has broad implications for
cognitive science and its relation to evolutionary biology. Importantly, a given property of
the linguistic system can be “specific” to the domain of language in several ways. For
example, if the property evolved by natural selection under the pressure of the linguistic
function it serves then the property is domain-specific in the sense that its design is
tailored for language. Equally though, if that property evolved to serve a different function
or if that property is domain-general, it may nevertheless interact with the linguistic
system in a way that is unique. This gives a second sense in which a property can be
thought of as specific to language. An evolutionary approach to the language faculty
might at first blush appear to favor domain-specificity in the first sense, with individual
properties of the language faculty being specifically linguistic adaptations. However, we
argue that interactions between learning, culture, and biological evolution mean any
domain-specific adaptations that evolve will take the form of weak biases rather than
hard constraints. Turning to the latter sense of domain-specificity, we highlight a very
general bias, simplicity, which operates widely in cognition and yet interacts with linguistic
representations in domain-specific ways.
Keywords: language evolution, domain-specificity, simplicity, typological universals, compositionality, word order,
regularization
INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental issues in cognitive science is the extent to which specifically linguistic
mechanisms and representations underpin our knowledge of language and the way it is learned.
This is in part because this issue has deep implications for the underlying uniqueness of a systemwe
typically consider exclusive to humans. It has also been highly divisive in the sense that researchers
from distinct traditions often have polar starting assumptions as to the likelihood of domain-
specific properties of the language system. Here we will suggest that there are in fact (at least) two
ways in which a given feature of the linguistic system may be considered to have domain-specific
properties:
(1) If that feature evolved by natural selection under the pressure of the linguistic function it serves.
(2) If that feature is domain-general but interacts with the linguistic system and its representations
in a way that is unique.
These two types of domain-specificity are quite different in terms of their implications for the
evolution of language, and below we will discuss a set of results from computational models
Culbertson and Kirby Simplicity and Specificity in Language
suggesting that domain-specificity of the first kind is unlikely
to take the form of hard constraints on the linguistic
system. Rather, if such constraints exist, they are likely to
be weak biases, amplified through cultural evolution. This
has important implications for linguistic theory, since, as we
discuss below, many mainstream frameworks explicitly argue
for hard domain-specific constraints and reject the notion
of weak bias. The second type of domain-specificity, on the
other hand, is likely to be widespread, and highlights the
importance of collaborative efforts between experts in linguistic
theory—who study the architecture and representations of
language—and experts studying cognition across domains and
species.
DOMAIN-SPECIFICITY AND EVOLUTION
In this section, we focus on the first sense of domain-specificity
set out above, which interprets the issue in functional terms.
This is perhaps the most obvious sense in which a particular
aspect of the cognitive system might be specific to language,
and it is the one which places a heavier burden on biological
evolution. Importantly, it is the ultimate rather than proximate
function that is relevant here; knowing that some feature of the
cognitive system is used in processing or acquiring language
is not, in and of itself, an argument for domain-specificity.
We can no more argue that such a feature is language specific
because it is active in language processing than we can argue
for an aspect of cognition being chess-specific simply because
it is active in the brain of a chess player. Rather, we need
to consider the ultimate function of the cognitive architecture
in question by looking to its evolutionary history. An aspect
of our cognitive architecture is specific to language if it arose
as an adaptive response to the problem of learning or using
language1.
This argument places evolution right at the core of the
question of the existence of language-specific features of our
cognitive architecture. While some cross-species comparative
data exist to help us trace the functional sources of various
cognitive capacities (see Fitch, 2010 for review), these data are
limited by the degree to which the relevant aspects of language
are autapomorphies (completely novel traits that are not found in
any other species). Recent research has turned to computational
modeling to provide a more direct testing ground for specific
hypotheses about how the capacities involved in language may
have evolved. In particular, a number of papers have looked
at whether domain-specific hard constraints on language can
evolve from a prior stage where biases were less strong or not
present at all (e.g., Kirby and Hurford, 1997; Briscoe, 2000;
Smith and Kirby, 2008; Chater et al., 2009; Thompson, 2015).
This is important, since many linguistic theories conceive of
the language capacity as including a set of constraints of this
kind: for example, Biberauer et al. (2014), working in the
Minimalist framework (Chomsky, 1993), argue for a constraint
1Note this is true even if we then happen to use this aspect of our cognitive system
for other, additional purposes. The fact that we use our language faculty for solving
crosswords does not constitute an argument against domain-specificity of that
faculty.
which places a hard (inviolable) restriction on the distribution
of the feature triggering movement (they call it the “Final-
Over-Final” constraint, in a nod to the structural description of
word orders the constraint rules out). Similarly, in Optimality
Theory (Prince and Smolensky, 1993/2004), although a particular
constraint may be violated in a given language, the standard
mechanism for explaining typological data is to restrict the set of
constraints. For example Culbertson et al. (2013) describe an OT
grammar for word order in the noun phrase which completely
rules out particular patterns by using a limited set of so-called
alignment constraints (see also Steddy and Samek-Lodovici,
2011).
To investigate how hard domain-specific constraints of this
type might evolve, Chater et al. (2009) describe a simulation
of a population of language-learning agents. The genes of these
agents specify whether learning of different aspects of language
is tightly constrained or highly flexible. Agents in the simulation
that successfully communicate are more likely to pass on their
genes to future generations. The question that Chater et al.
(2009) ask is whether genes encoding constraints evolve in
populations which start out highly flexible under the selection
pressure for communication. If they do, then this would support
a language faculty in which language acquisition is constrained
by domain-specific principles. This process, whereby traits that
were previously acquired through experience become nativised,
is known as the Baldwin Effect (Baldwin, 1896; Maynard Smith,
1986; Hinton and Nowlan, 1987), and a number of authors
have suggested it played a role in the evolution of the language
faculty (Kirby and Hurford, 1997; Jackendoff, 2002; Turkel,
2002). However, Chater et al. (2009) argue that the fact that
languages change over time makes the situation of language
evolution quite different from that of other learned traits. In
their simulations, if the rate of language change is high enough,
it is impossible for genetic evolution to keep up–language
presents a moving target, and domain-specific constraints cannot
evolve.
Chater et al.’s (2009) model is a critique of a particular view
of the language faculty in which hard innate constraints are
placed on the form languages can take. Because of this they do
not model a scenario in which the strength of bias is allowed
to evolve freely (although they do show that their model gives
similar results whether genes encode hard constraints, or very
strong biases). However, there is growing support for a more
nuanced view of language acquisition in which learners have
biases that come in a range of strengths (e.g., Morgan et al.,
1989; Wilson, 2006; Hudson Kam and Newport, 2009; Smith and
Wonnacott, 2010; Culbertson and Smolensky, 2012; Culbertson
et al., 2013; Chater et al., 2015). If the genes underpinning the
language faculty were able to specify everything from a very weak
bias all the way to a hard constraint, then perhaps this would
allow evolution to take a gradual path from an unbiased learner
to a strongly-constraining, domain-specific language faculty. To
find out if this is the case, we need a model that shows how
bias strength affects the nature of the languages that emerge in
a population.
The iterated learning model (Kirby et al., 2007) starts from
the observation that the way languages evolve culturally is
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driven by the way in which languages are learned2. This model
of cultural evolution suggests that the languages spoken by
a population will not necessarily directly reflect the learning
biases of that population (Figure 1). In particular, in many cases,
cultural evolution will tend to amplify weak learning biases.
This has important implications for how constraints on the
language faculty actually come to be reflected in properties of
language. For example, the observation that some property of
language is universally, or near universally, present in language
is not sufficient for us to infer that there is a corresponding
strong constraint in our language faculty. Indeed, if Kirby et al.
(2007) are correct, then the strength of any constraint in the
language faculty may be unrelated to the strength of reflection
of that constraint cross-linguistically. Weak learning biases may
be sufficient to give rise to exceptionless, or near exceptionless,
universals.
Smith and Kirby (2008) examine the implications of iterated
learning for the biological evolution of the language faculty.
Their simulation explicitly models three processes involved in the
origins of linguistic structure: individual learning of languages
from data; cultural evolution of languages in a population
through iterated learning; and biological evolution of learning
biases themselves. They show that neither hard constraints nor
strong biases emerge from the evolutionary process even when
2Our emphasis in this article will be on learning, but there are other mechanisms
that operate at the individual level but whose effect is felt at the population level.
For example, the way in which hearers process input, and the way in which
speakers produce output is likely to have a significant impact. See Kirby (1999)
for an extended treatment of precisely how processing and learning interact with
cultural transmission to give rise to language universals, and Futrell et al. (2015),
Fedzechkina et al. (2012), and Jaeger and Tily (2011) for recent accounts of
specific links between processing and language structure. However, the debate
about domain generality/specificity plays out differently for processing than for
learning, and as such will not be the focus of this review. In particular, here we
discuss simplicity as a highly general learning bias that unifies a range of different
domains both within and beyond language, and it is not clear that an equivalent
notion of simplicity exists for processing.
agents are being selected for their ability to communicate using
a shared language. This is a consequence of the amplifying
effect of cultural evolution; the fitness of an organism is not
derived directly from that organism’s genes, but rather from the
organism’s phenotype. In the case of language evolution this is the
actual language an individual has learned. If weak learning biases
are amplified by cultural evolution, then the difference between a
weak bias and a hard constraint is neutralized: both can lead to
strong effects on the distribution of languages. What this means
is that iterated learning effectively masks the genes underpinning
the language faculty from the view of natural selection. They are
free to drift; strongly-constraining domain-specific constraints
on language learning are likely to be lost due to mutation, or not
arise in the first place (see also, Thompson, 2015 for a detailed
analysis of the evolutionary dynamics in this case).
Taken together these modeling results show that domain-
specific hard constraints on language learning are unlikely to
evolve, because languages change too fast (Chater et al., 2009)
and because cultural evolution amplifies the effect of weak biases
(Kirby et al., 2007). However, the results of this latter model
suggest a further conclusion: weak biases for language learning
are more evolvable by virtue of cultural evolution’s amplifying
effect. Any tiny change from neutrality in learning can lead to big
changes in the language that the population uses. Just as culture
masks the strength of bias from the view of natural selection, it
unmasks non-neutrality. We argue that linguists should not shy
away from formulating domain-specific aspects of the language
faculty in terms of weak, defeasible biases. This is the type of
language faculty that is most likely to evolve.
Although we propose that strong domain-specific biases on
language should be avoided on evolutionary grounds, this does
not mean that strong domain-general biases are impossible.
These may be the result of very general architectural or
computational considerations that govern the way cognition
operates, for example (falling under the third of Chomsky’s,
2005 three factors in language design). Equally, the way we learn
FIGURE 1 | The link between genes and the universal properties of language is mediated by development and cultural transmission. The extent to which
these two processes have non-trivial dynamics is an important consideration when proposing evolutionary accounts of language. Fitness does not depend directly on
the genes underpinning the language faculty, but rather the linguistic phenotype (i.e., languages). This opens up the possibility for development and cultural
transmission to shield genetic variation from the view of natural selection (Figure adapted from Kirby et al., 2007). © 2007 by The National Academy of Sciences of the
USA.
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language might be shaped by relatively strong domain-general
biases that arise as a result of evolution for something other
than language, for which the amplifying effect of culture does
not apply. Biases such as these may nevertheless interact with
language and linguistic representations in domain-specific ways.
In the next section we will examine a learning bias that is arguably
the most domain-general of all—simplicity—and show how its
application in a range of different aspects of language leads to
domain-specific outcomes.
SIMPLICITY
Simplicity has been proposed as a unifying principle of cognitive
science (Chater and Vitányi, 2003). The tradition of arguing
for a general simplicity bias has a long history in the context
of scientific reasoning dating back to William of Occam
in the 14th century who stated that we should prefer the
simplest explanation for some phenomenon all other things
being equal. In other words, when choosing among hypotheses
that explain data equally well, the simpler one should be
chosen.
This principle can be extended straightforwardly from
scientific reasoning to cognitive systems. When faced with an
induction problem we must have some way of dealing with the
fact that there are many candidate hypotheses that are consistent
with the observed data (typically an infinite number). So, for
example, in a function learning task how do we interpolate from
seen to unseen points when there are an infinite number of
possible functions that could relate the two (Figure 2). Or, to give
a more trivial example, why is it that we assume that the sun
will continue to rise every day when there are an infinite range
of hypotheses available to us which predict it won’t.
Here again the simplicity bias provides an answer by giving
us a way to distinguish between otherwise equally explanatory
hypotheses. While a full treatment of why simplicity rather than
some other bias is the correct way to solve this problem is beyond
the scope of this article (accessible introductions are given in
Mitchell, 1997; Chater et al., 2015), we can give an intuitive
FIGURE 2 | There are an infinite set of possible functions interpolating
from seen points to unseen points in these graphs. Our intuition is that
the linear function on the left represents a more reasonable hypothesis than
the one on the right, despite the fact that both fit the data perfectly well. In
other words, we have prior expectations about what functions are more likely
than others. In this case, the prior includes a preference for linearity (cf. Kalish
et al., 2007).
flavor in terms of Bayesian inference. According to Bayes
rule, induction involves combining the probability distribution
over hypotheses defined by the data with a prior probability
distribution over these hypotheses. More formally, the best
hypothesis, h, for some data, D, will maximize P(D|h)P(h).
hbest = argmaxh∈HP(h|D) = argmaxh∈HP(D|h)P(h)
What can this tell us about simplicity? We can express this
equivalently by taking logs of these probabilities. The best
hypothesis is the one that minimizes the sum of negative log
probabilities of the data given that hypothesis, −log2P(D|h), and
the prior probability of the hypothesis itself,−log2P(h).
hbest = argminh∈H − log2P(h|D)
= argminh∈H − log2P(D|h)− log2P(h)
Information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) tells us that
this last quantity, −log2P(h), is the description length of h in
bits (assuming an optimal encoding scheme for our space of
hypotheses). So, all other things being equal, learners will choose
hypotheses that can be described more concisely—hypotheses
that are simpler.
Importantly, an information theoretic view of the equation
above also suggests learners will prefer representations that
provide (to a greater or lesser extent) some compression of the
data they have seen. What does this mean for the nature of
language? It suggests that languages will be more prevalent to the
extent that they are compressible. In general, a language will be
compressible if there are patterns within the set of sentences of
that language that can be captured by a grammatical description.
More precisely, a compressible set of sentences is one whose
minimum description length is short. The description length is
simply the sum of the length of the grammar (−log2P(h) in the
equation above) and the length of the data when described using
that grammar (given by the−log2P(D|h) term).
This argument has allowed us to relate our intuitive
understanding of simplicity—as a reasonable heuristic in
choosing between explanations—to a rational model of statistical
inference in a relatively straightforward way. Of course, there are
a lot of practical questions that this leaves unanswered. How, for
example, can we tell in a given domain what counts as a simpler
hypothesis? Unfortunately, there is no computable general
measure of complexity (Li and Vitányi, 1997), nevertheless we
propose that notions of relative simplicity should guide our
search for domain-general biases underpinning phenomena of
interest in language.
So, we argue that—whatever other biases learners have when
they face some learning problem—they are also likely to be
applying an overarching simplicity bias (Chomsky, 1957; Clark,
2001; Brighton, 2002; Kemp and Regier, 2012; Chater et al., 2015).
It is important to note that when we talk about simplicity
in the context of language, it is in terms of the overall
compressibility of that language, e.g., how much redundancy
and systematicity does it exhibit that can be captured simply
in a grammatical description, and how much irreducible
unpredictability remains in the data. We might also be interested
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in ways in which languages differ in the length of their utterances,
but this is a largely orthogonal issue. Indeed, it is possible for
a language with shorter strings to have a longer grammar—
consider cases of irregular morphology in which regularization
might simplify a paradigm at the cost of removal of short
irregulars.
The generality of the bias for simplicity suggests there
will be many linguistic phenomena affected by it. Below,
we discuss cases which have been documented both in
linguistic typological and experimental studies, with an emphasis
on morphology and syntax (for discussion of experimental
findings related to phonological simplicity, see Moreton and
Pater, 2012a,b). We will begin with a basic design feature
of language—compositionality—that can be characterized by
the interaction of simplicity with a competing pressures
for expressivity. We then move on to three additional
examples of increasingly narrow phenomena: regularization of
unconditioned variation, consistent head ordering or word order
harmony, and isomorphic mapping from semantic structure to
linear order. Each example illustrates a slightly different way in
which this domain-general bias interacts with features that are
particular to the linguistic domain.
Compositionality
For our first example we will consider a basic property of
language, often called a “design feature” (Hockett, 1960): the
compositional nature of the mapping between meanings and
forms. Language is arguably unique among naturally occurring
communication systems in consisting of utterances whose
meaning is a function of the meaning of its sub-parts and the
way they are put together. For example, the meaning of the word
“stars” is derived from the meaning of the root star combined
with the meaning of the plural morpheme -s. Similarly, the
meaning of a larger unit like “visible stars” is a function of the
meanings of the individual parts of the phrase. Switching the
order to “stars visible” changes the meaning of the unit in a
predictable way3.
3In this case, placing the adjective after the noun leads to the interpretation
“the stars visible (tonight).” This is a systematic rule of English: post-nominal
attributive adjectives are stage-level predicates, denoting temporary properties
(Cinque, 1993).
This ubiquitous feature of language makes it arguably
unique among naturally occurring communication systems, the
vast majority—perhaps all—of which are holistic rather than
compositional (Smith and Kirby, 2012). The striking divergence
from holism that we see in language (above the level of the word)
is therefore of great interest to those studying the evolution of
language. The fact that human communication is also highly
unusual in consisting of learned rather than innate mappings
between meanings and signals suggests that relating the origins
of compositionality to learning biases is a good place to start in
the search for an explanation.
A language that maps meanings onto signals randomly
(see Figure 3A) will be less compressible—and hence, less
simple in our terms—than one which maps them onto signals
in a predictable way (see Figure 3B). Where both signals
and meanings have internal, recombinable structure, then this
predictability will be realized as compositional mappings. To
see why this is, consider representing language as a transducer
relating meanings and signals. The transducer in Figure 4A gives
the most concise representation of an example holistic language,
whereas the transducer in Figure 4B gives the most concise
representation of an equivalent compositional language in which
subparts of the signals map onto subparts of the meanings. What
should be immediately apparent is that compositional languages
are more compressible.
Brighton (2002) uses this contrast to model the cultural
evolution of compositionality in an iterated learning framework
(Kirby et al., 2007). Individual agents in their simulation learn
transducers to map between a structured set of meanings and
signals made up of sequences of elements. Crucially, the learners
have a prior bias in favor of simpler transducers. In fact, the
prior probability of a particular transducer is inversely related
to its coding length in bits in precisely the way outlined in
our discussion of simplicity above. Each agent learns their
language by observing meaning-signal pairs produced by the
previous agent in the simulation, and then goes on to produce
meaning-signal pairs for transmission to the next generation.
As the language in these simulations is repeatedly learned and
reproduced, the bias of the agents in favor of simplicity shapes
the evolutionary dynamic. Despite the fact that these models
involve no biological evolution, the grammars adapt gradually
FIGURE 3 | A simplified geometric sketch of possible mappings between two domains, for example meanings and signals. These mappings can be
unstructured, random and incompressible (A), or highly structured and compressible (B). An individual attempting to learn the latter could use similarity structure in
one domain to predict what the appropriate generalization should be for unseen points. A further possibility is a degenerate mapping, which is the simplest and most
compressible of all (C).
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FIGURE 4 | Two simple transducers that map between a subset of the
English verbs and their meanings, where “S” is the start symbol for the
transducers and meanings are given in caps after a colon in each rule.
Transducers can be holistic, essentially a dictionary of meaning-signal pairs
(A); or compositional, in which the meaning of a signal is composed of the
meaning of parts of that signal (B).
over cultural generations from ones that are random and holistic
to ones that are compositional4.
This result makes intuitive sense if you think about the process
of transmission from the point of view of the emerging rules
and regularities in the mapping between meanings and signals. A
highly specific feature of the evolving language (e.g., a particular
idiosyncratic label for a single meaning, like went as the past
tense of GO) will be harder to learn than a generalization
over a large number of meanings (e.g., a morpheme, like –ed,
that shows up in the signals associated with a wide range of
meanings). Particularly if learners only see a subset of all possible
meanings, this inevitably leads to a preferential transmission of
broader and broader generalizations that apply across large parts
of the language. Hurford (2000) puts it pithily, stating “social
transmission favors linguistic generalization.”
The simplicity bias thus appears to predict one of the
fundamental design features of human language. However, things
are not quite so straightforward. Consider a language in which
every meaning is expressed by the same signal (Figure 3C). This
degenerate language will be even more compressible than the
compositional one, suggesting that a domain-general bias for
simplicity is not sufficient to explain the origins of compositional
structure. Cornish (2011) argues that in fact all simulations of
iterated learning purporting to demonstrate the emergence of
compositionality have in some way implemented a constraint
that rules out degeneracy. It is simply impossible for the learners
4Brighton (2002) makes the simplicity bias of the learners in his model overt by
counting the numbers of bits in the encoding of transducers that generate the
data the learners see. However, this does not mean that we necessarily believe that
this kind of representation of grammars is necessary for an implementational or
algorithmic account of what language we are doing when they learn language.
Rather, this is a computational level account in (Marr, 1982) terms. It is an
empirical question whether the particular ranking of grammars in terms of
simplicity that we can derive from this particular representation matches precisely
the ranking that applies in the case of real language learners, but we are confident
that the crucial distinction between degenerate < compositional < holistic is
correct. This matches behavior of participants in the lab (Kirby et al., 2015) and
broadly similar results are found in both connectionist and symbolic models of
iterated learning (Kirby and Hurford, 2002; Brace et al., 2015).
in these simulation models to acquire a language that maps many
meanings to one signal. Similarly, in the first laboratory analog
of these iterated learning simulations, Kirby et al. (2008) report
that degenerate languages rapidly evolve over a few generations
of human learners.
Kirby et al. (2015) argue that a countervailing pressure for
expressivity is required to avoid the collapse of languages in
iterated learning experiments to this degenerate end point. The
obvious pressure arises not from learning, but from use. If pairs
of participants learn an artificial language and then go on to use
it in a dyadic interaction task, then there are two pressures on the
language in the experiment: a pressure to be compressible arising
from participants’ domain-general simplicity bias in learning,
and a pressure to be expressive arising from participants’ use
of the language to solve a communicative task. Kirby et al.
(2015) show that compositionality only arises when both of
these two pressures are in play. In this case then, a domain-
general bias is only explanatorily adequate once we take into
account features of its domain of application. In other words,
the case of compositionality illustrates that the simplicity bias is
domain-specific in the sense that we cannot understand how it
shapes language without also appealing to the special function of
language as a system of communication.
Regularization
There is converging evidence from multiple strands of research
including pidgin/creole studies, sociolinguistics, language
acquisition, and computational cognitive science suggesting that
language tends to minimize unpredictable or unconditioned
variation. Variation can be introduced by non-native speaker
errors, contact with speakers of other languages, or in the case
of newly emerging languages, variation may reflect a lack of
conventionalized grammar. In the latter case, there is evidence
that new generations of learners regularize and conventionalize
these noisy systems (e.g., Sankoff, 1979; Mühlhäusler, 1986;
Meyerhoff, 2000; Senghas and Coppola, 2001). Natural language
and laboratory language learning research has further shown
that both children and adults learn and reproduce conditioned
variation relatively well compared to unpredictable variation
(e.g., Singleton and Newport, 2004; Hudson Kam and Newport,
2005, 2009; Smith et al., 2007; Smith and Wonnacott, 2010;
Culbertson et al., 2012). For example, Singleton and Newport
(2004) report the case of a child acquiring American Sign
Language (ASL) from late-learner parents. While the parents’
realization of several grammatical features of ASL was variable,
the child did not reproduce this variation. Rather, he regularized
his parents’ variable productions, resulting in a much more
consistent system (though in some aspects it differed from ASL).
Following up on this finding using an experimental paradigm,
Hudson Kam and Newport (2009) report that, when trained on
a grammar with unpredictable use of determiners, child learners
(and to a lesser extent adults) regularize those determiners, using
them according to a consistent rule.
Computational modeling has formalized this in terms of
learners’ a priori expectations, namely that observed data come
from a deterministic generative process (Reali and Griffiths,
2009; Culbertson and Smolensky, 2012; Culbertson et al., 2013).
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This has a natural interpretation in terms of simplicity, since
the description of a language that only allows one option
in a particular context will be shorter than one that allows
multiple variants5. More generally, as we’ve seen already, there’s
a straightforward relationship between the entropy of the
distribution of variants and the coding length of that distribution.
More predictable processes can be captured by shorter overall
descriptions: they are compressible (Ferdinand, 2015). However,
the expectation that the world will be deterministic is to
some extent dependent on the domain in question. Most
obviously, prior experience in a given domain can override this
expectation—e.g., we expect that a coin being tossed will be
fair and therefore outcomes will be random (Reali and Griffiths,
2009). In a carefully controlled study comparing learning of
unpredictable variation in a linguistic vs. non-linguistic domain,
Ferdinand (2015) found that regularization occurs in both
domains. However, across a number of conditions manipulating
system complexity, the bias is stronger for linguistic stimuli.
Regularization thus illustrates a case in which the strength
of a bias is domain-specific, perhaps dependent on previous
experience and functional pressures relevant to that domain.
While most recent work on regularization focuses on
unconditioned or random variation, there is some evidence that
even conditioned variation is avoided in language. For example,
English is losing its system of irregular (variable) past tense
marking in favor of a single rule (add -ed) despite this variation
being lexically conditioned (Hooper, 1976). Similarly, while some
languages allow widespread lexically or semantically conditioned
variation in adjective placement, most languages tend to order
them more or less consistently before or after (Dryer, 2013). This
can be related straightforwardly to simplicity; a grammar with a
single (high-level) rule or constraint applying to all words of a
given type is more compressible than one in which different such
words must obey different rules. For example, a grammar with
a single rule stating that adjectives must always precede nouns
is simpler than one which has to specify that certain adjectives
precede and others follow.
Harmony
Interestingly, this reflex of simplicity applies not only to word
order within a word class, but also across classes of words. Some
of the best known typological universals describe correlations
among words orders across different phrase types. For example,
Greenberg (1963) lists a set of universals, collated from a sample
of 30 languages, including the following:
Universal 2: In languages with prepositions, the genitive almost
always follows the governing noun, while in languages with
postpositions it almost always precedes.
Universal 18:When the descriptive adjective precedes the noun,
the demonstrative and the numeral, with overwhelmingly more
than chance frequency, do likewise.
5Note that this requires taking into account the simplicity of the generating
grammar and the simplicity (compressibility) of the data. A grammar which
allows free variation may be simpler than a grammar which generates conditioned
variation, however the random data produced by the former grammar is not
compressible.
These universals are part of the evidence for word order
harmony—the tendency for a certain class of words to appear
in a consistent position, either first or last, across different
phrase types in a given language (Greenberg, 1963; Chomsky,
1981; Hawkins, 1983; Travis, 1984; Dryer, 1992; Baker, 2001; for
experimental evidence see Culbertson et al., 2012; Culbertson and
Newport, 2015). At its root, this is just an extension of the same
very general statement of within-category order consistency.
However, absent a notion of what ties certain categories of
words together, the connection between harmony and simplicity
remains opaque. For example, the two universals quoted above
make reference to a single category—noun—and how it is
ordered relative to a number of other categories. Based on
syntactic class alone, simplicity predicts that nouns should be
ordered consistently relative to all these other categories. This
is, of course, the wrong prediction; Universal 2 actually says
that the order of nouns relative to adpositions is the opposite
of the order of nouns relative to genitives. While adpositions
and genitives thus tend to appear on different sides of the noun,
it turns out that adjectives, demonstratives, and numerals often
pattern with genitives (note that English is a counterexample).
These tendencies are exemplified in (3).
3) a. Preposition N {Adj, Num, Dem, Gen}
b. {Adj, Num, Dem, Gen} N Postposition
Tomake sense of this, we need a notion that connects adpositions
as they relate to nouns, with nouns as they relate to the other
categories. The most popular such notion provided by linguistic
theory is the head-dependent relation. In this example, the noun
is a head with respect to nominal modifiers—including genitive
phrases, adjectives, numerals, and demonstratives. By contrast,
the noun is a dependent in an adpositional construction. When
stated in this way, harmony falls out: in the world’s languages,
there is a tendency for heads to consistently precede or follow
their dependents. The former type is often called head-initial,
the latter head-final. Coming back to simplicity then, a language
which has a single high-level rule stating that heads either precede
or follow their dependents is simpler than one which has specific
ordering rules for heads in distinct phrase types. Simplicity
therefore predicts that the more specific rules a grammar has, the
less likely it should be.
Importantly, a clear understanding of whether this prediction
is borne out depends on the precise definition of the relevant
relation between word categories. This turns out to be
controversial. For example, particular theories differ in what is
deemed to be a head, and whether “head” is in fact the relevant
notion at all (Hawkins, 1983; Zwicky, 1985; Hudson, 1987; Dryer,
1992; Corbett et al., 1993). Dryer (1992) provides typological
evidence that head order does not correlate across all phrase
types. For example, he reports that the order of verb (head)
and object (dependent) correlates with the order of preposition
(head) and noun (dependent) within a language, but not with
noun (head) and adjective (dependent) order. This is unexpected
if the simplicity bias is indeed based on head-dependent order.
He therefore argues that a different notion, related to the average
length or complexity of particular phrase types, must be used
in order to see that languages do indeed prefer higher-level
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rules governing order across multiple phrase types. Regardless of
whether Dryer’s precise formulation is correct, what this suggests
is that merely stating that simplicity is a factor in determining
word order does not allow us to determine which grammars are
in fact the simplest. In order to do this, we need a theory of
linguistic representations which tells us which should be treated
as parallel and in what contexts.
From the perspective of the learner, there is also a clear sense
in which the simplicity bias as it relates to word order harmony
depends on linguistic representations. Given three words, in
the absence of any knowledge about the relations between and
among them, there is no way simplicity can be used by a learner
to make inferences about likely orderings. These representations
must be present (e.g., learned) before a simplicity bias can
be active. How and when they develop—i.e., when particular
syntactic categories are differentiated, when abstract higher-level
categories like head develop, etc.—will dictate how simplicity
impacts learners’ inferences.
Isomorphic Mapping
The relation between word order and semantic interpretation in
a number of domains also appears to be affected by a simplicity
bias. For example, Greenberg’s (1963) Universal 18 describes how
nominal modifiers are ordered relative to the noun. Universal 20
builds on this, describing how those modifiers tend to be ordered
relative to one another.
Universal 20 (as restated by Cinque, 2005):
In pre-nominal position the order of demonstrative, numeral,
and adjective (or any subset thereof) is Dem-Num-Adj.
In post-nominal position the order is either Dem-Num-Adj or
Adj-Num-Dem.
Interestingly, while both post-nominal orders are indeed
possible, addition typological work since Greenberg (1963)
indicates that the second order is much more common. In
fact, Dem-Num-Adj-N, and N-Adj-Num-Dem are the two most
common orders found in the world’s languages by far. Part
of this is likely due to the harmony bias described above;
assuming nominal modifiers are covered by the relevant notion
of dependent, these two orders are harmonic, while alternative
possibilities are not (e.g., Dem-Num-N-Adj). However, harmony
does not explain why N-Adj-Num-Demwould be more common
than N-Dem-Num-Adj. An explanation of this difference
depends on how syntax–specifically, linearization—interacts
with underlying semantic structure.
Several theoretical lines of research converge on a universal
semantic representation of these modifiers and their relation
to the noun. On one view, this representation reflects iconicity
of relations (Rijkhoff, 2004). For example, adjectives modify
inherent properties of nouns, numerals count those larger
units, and demonstratives connect those countable units to the
surrounding discourse. This describes a nesting representation
as in Figure 5A. Research in formal linguistics further suggests
a hierarchical relation between these elements in terms of
semantic combination, illustrated in Figure 5B. Crucially, these
abstract relations are preserved in linear orders that have the
adjective closest to the noun and the demonstrative most
peripheral—orders that can be read directly off Figure 5A. Notice
that N-Adj-Num-Dem is one such order, while N-Dem-Num-
Adj is not (the modifiers must be swapped around to get
this order). Recent laboratory studies suggest a corresponding
cognitive bias, in favor of isomorphic mappings between
nominal semantics and linear order (Culbertson and Adger,
2014). Typological frequency differences in this domain can
be therefore be much better explained once we take into
account the underlying semantic structure and an isomorphism
bias.
This is not the only case of isomorphic mappings from
semantics to linear order, indeed perhaps the most well-
known case is the mirror principle in the domain of verbal
inflection (Baker, 1985; Bybee, 1985; Rice, 2000). Languages
tend to order inflectional morphemes like tense and aspect
in a way that reflects semantic composition, as shown in
Figure 66.
Biases in favor of isomorphism between semantics and linear
order can again be reduced to a general simplicity bias. In very
general terms, more transparent or predictable relations between
order and meaning are simpler than ones with extra arbitrary
6Interestingly, the acquisition of semantics literature provides a related
observation. Musolino et al. (2000) show that when asked to interpret
ambiguous sentences with quantificational elements, children strongly prefer the
interpretation that corresponds to the surface syntactic position of those elements.
For example, the sentence “Every horse didn’t jump over the fence,” could involve
every taking scope over not (meaning no horses jumped over the fence), or not
scoping over every (meaning not every horse jumped over the fence). The first
interpretation is isomorphic to the linear order, and this is the interpretation
preferred by young children (see also Musolino and Lidz, 2003).
FIGURE 5 | Nested representation (A) and hierarchical representation (B) of semantic relations between modifiers and the noun. The most typologically
common orders can be read off directly.
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FIGURE 6 | Schematic representation of semantic composition in
verbal domain.
stipulations. Brighton and Kirby (2006) show that isomorphic7
mappings between signals and meanings arise naturally from
iterated learning under general simplicity considerations. Put
in more precise terms, to derive surface order from semantics,
each branch of the hierarchical structure (or each rectangle in
the nested schematic) in the figure above represents a choice
point for linearization. For isomorphic orders, that is all that
is required: N-Adj-Num-Dem means choosing (1) Adj after
N, (2) Num after [N-Adj], and (3) Dem after [N-Adj-Num].
Similarly, a non-harmonic but isomorphic order like Dem-Num-
N-Adj is (1) Adj after N, (2) Num before [N-Adj], and (3)
Dem before [Num-N-Adj]. By contrast, non-isomorphic orders
require additional choice points or rules. N-Dem-Num-Adj, for
example, cannot be derived from the semantic hierarchy alone—
the simplest route is Dem-Num-Adj-N (three choice points) plus
one addition rule placing N first. The isomorphism bias again
illustrates that the notion of simplicity, however general, must
be formulated with reference to specific hypotheses about the
domain in question—here, about conceptual iconicity or formal
compositional semantics.
CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the language faculty includes capacities
and constraints that are domain-general or co-opted from
other cognitive systems. Whether it also includes domain-
specific features is both less clear, and more likely to split
along philosophical lines; traditionally, generative linguistics
has argued for a Universal Grammar containing (among
other things) linguistically contentful principles that place hard
constraints on what is learnable. We have suggested, based
on results obtained using computational models of language
evolution, that domain-specific hard constraints are much less
likely to have evolved than weak biases. This is essentially
because the cultural evolution of language exerts cognition-
external pressures that mean linguistic phenotypes no longer
directly reflect the underlying genotype. The strength of
7These authors use the term “topographic” rather than “isomorphic” because of
similarity to the neuroanatomical organizing principle of topographic maps. For
our purposes the terms are interchangeable, since both give rise to the property that
neighboring representations in one domain map to neighboring representations in
the other.
any particular bias is underdetermined by the cross-linguistic
distribution of language types. At the same time, these cognition-
external pressures allow weak genetically-encoded biases to
have potentially large typological effects. While this does not
categorically rule out the existence of very strong (or inviolable)
biases that have evolved specifically for language, it clearly
suggests we should not treat them as the default hypothesis.
The idea that weak biases for language-specific structures or
patterns are more likely is in line with recent trends in linguistics.
Researchers in phonology and syntax have begun using formal
models which encode probabilistic biases in order to better
capture empirical data from typology and learning (e.g., Hayes
and Wilson, 2008; Pater, 2009; Culbertson et al., 2013; White,
2014).
Regardless of whether the language faculty contains domain-
specific capacities, the representations which make up our
linguistic knowledge, and the function of language as a system
of communication means that domain-general capacities will
interact with language in unique ways. This is most convincingly
illustrated by looking at an uncontroversially general bias: the
bias in favor of representational simplicity. The examples we
have discussed here show that a simplicity bias is reflected in a
range of language universals that cut across very different aspects
of the linguistic system: compositionality, regularity, harmony,
and isomorphism. In each case, the simplicity bias interacts
with linguistic representations to give rise to domain-specific
effects. In the case of compositionality, simplicity interacts with
the major unique function of language as a communication
system that must be expressive. It is only via the interaction
of these two pressures that compositional systems will emerge.
The regularization bias, which describes the established finding
that language learners tend to reduce random or unconditioned
variation, shows domain-specific effects in terms of its strength.
Word order harmony, the tendency for languages to order heads
consistently before or after dependents, depends crucially on
a language- and even theory-specific notion of the relevant
categories. Finally, the notion of isomorphism between semantic
or conceptual structure and surface word order crucially requires
an articulated hypothesis about the specific semantic relations
among dependent elements.
In all these cases, distinct hypotheses about linguistic
categories, their representations, and how they relate to one
another will make distinct predictions about how simplicity
is cashed out. This means that an understanding of language,
how it is learned, and how it evolved will necessarily require
input from linguists formulating theories of the architecture and
representations of language. The fact the many aspects of the
capacity for language also come from broader cognition means
linguists in turn must take into account findings from research
on other cognitive domains, and indeed on related capacities in
other species.
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